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University Faculty and the
Institution of Collective Bargaining
By

THOMAS

C.

FENTON*

This cacophony of grievances, subjection, supervisors, layoffs, and domination by agents of the enemy sounds foreign
in the idyllic ivory tower where one hears only the music of
the spheres. It also seems alien to the earthy campus struggles where power flows not so much from the titles and offices as from the charisma, credentials, and credibility of the

individual combatants. 1
INTRODUCTION

Collective bargaining among university professors is a recent phenomenon. Because it is such a new area in the law of
collective bargaining, the major issues presented before the

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) and subsequently the courts under the National Labor Relations Act
have been the threshold questions of Board jurisdiction and
definition of appropriate bargaining units.2 Indeed, most cases
involving definition of an appropriate bargaining unit have
not proceeded beyond the level of the Board; consequently,
* B.A., Centre College; J.D., Ohio State University. Mr. Fenton is associated
with the Louisville, Kentucky law firm of Greenebaum, Treitz & Maggiolo and is -engaged in the private practice of labor law.
I Moore, The Determination of Bargaining Units for College Faculties, 37 U.
Pirr. L. REv. 43, 49 (1975).
2 A few cases have presented charges of a refusal to bargain with the representatives of the employees. See Catholic Univ. of America, 236 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1978);
Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597 (1977), enforcement denied, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1978), afl'd, 444 U.S. 672 (1980); Kendall College, 228 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1977), enforced,
570 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1978); Trustees of Boston Univ., 228 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1977),
enforced, 575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1978), vacated & remanded, 445 U.S. 912 (1980);
Niagara Univ., 226 N.L.R.B. 918 (1976), enforcement denied, 558 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir.
1977); St. Francis College, 224 N.L.R.B. 907 (1976), enforcement denied, 562 F.2d 246
(3rd Cir. 1977); Mercy College, 219 N.L.R.B. 81 (1975), enforcement denied, 536 F.2d
544 (2d Cir. 1976), dismissed, 231 N.L.R.B. 315 (1977); Wentworth Inst., 210
N.L.R.B. 345 (1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975). These cases generally
have been summarily adjudicated by the Board. As the above citations indicate, the
courts of appeals have given a mixed reception to the Board's rulings on cases.
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NLRB decisions provide the controlling law on this issue. One
major exception to this generalization, however, is the recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University.3 In Yeshiva, the Court rejected the
Board's established position that faculty committee members
are not managerial employees by virtue of certain management functions of their committees and held that such faculty
members were to be excluded from the bargaining unit.
The Yeshiva decision has an enormous potential to frustrate the development of a collective bargaining apparatus by
university faculty,' particularly when applied to smaller colleges and universities. This article will discuss Yeshiva and its
impact on the formulation of an appropriate bargaining unit
for university professors. Other problems in the unit definition context also will be examined. Finally, issues surrounding
Board jurisdiction over religious educational institutions will
be analyzed.
I.

JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD

For collective bargaining to proceed under the National
Labor Relations Act, the activities in question must fall
within the jurisdiction of the Board. This jurisdiction extends
broadly to include employers and employees whose disputes
adversely affect interstate commerce. 5 Several significant exceptions to this jurisdictional reach are stated in the Act. Federal and state governments and their political subdivisions are
exempted as employers;6 agricultural workers, domestic servants, independent contractors, and supervisors are also ex3 NLRB v. Yeshiva

Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
In discussions with the author at a recent seminar sponsored by Region 9 of the
National Labor Relations Board, the view was expressed that the Yeshiva decision
4

amounted to a tremendous setback to the Board's endeavors in recent years to assure
private university professional employees the rights to select a bargaining representative and to bargain collectively with their employer. According to this view, Yeshiva
represents a significant jurisdictional restriction now imposed against the Board in its
development of labor law in the university context. See generally, Wall St. J., Feb.
21, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (brief analysis of the Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision).
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(6), (7) (1976).
6 Id. § 152(2).
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empted from the statute's scope. 7 Further, the Board traditionally has declined to assert its jurisdiction when such
assertion would not aid the implementation of the policies of
the Act.
The initial position of the Board with regard to the private university as an employer in interstate commerce was
that Act policies would not be aided by an assertion of Board
jurisdiction. In Trustees of Columbia University,$ the Board
relied on subjective factors of policy considerations in declining to assert its jurisdiction over private universities. The
Board's decision rested predominantly upon a recognition of
the unique status of the university and the unique nature of
its activities.9
Under all the circumstances, we do not believe that it
would effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert its jurisdiction over a nonprofit, educational institution
where the activities involved are noncommercial in nature
and intimately connected with the charitable purposes and
educational activities of the institution. 10
The Board's holding was narrow. In citing the unique status
of the university, the Board did not hold that the university's
nonprofit and noncommercial orientation or its educational
and charitable purposes defeated jurisdiction. Indeed, the
Board explicitly stated the contrary and held that the exercise
of jurisdiction simply was not warranted in the given
situation."'
The Board's policy of declining jurisdiction where the
employer was found to be in the business of education raised
Id. § 152(3).
a 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
' The facts of Trustees of Columbia Univ. affirm that the Board looked only to
the nature of the employer in that case. The bargaining unit sought was one of clerical workers on the staff of the library. Although it is perhaps true that the university
was distinguishable from the typical industrial or commercial employer and thereby
the Board's disinclination to deal with it was justified, the employees who sought
representation in Columbia were by no means significantly different from the typical
industrial or commercial employee.
" Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. at 427.
" In sum, the Board stated: "We do not believe that it would effectuate the
policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction here." Id. at 425.
7
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the question of defining an educational institution. Beginning
with Woods Hole OceanographicInstitution,12 the Board developed a balancing test to determine whether an employer
was primarily a commercial concern or an educational one.
Among the factors considered were the degree of financial
support and control coming from without the institution, for
whom research was performed, who employed the researchers,
and who operated the concern.1 3 The Board asserted jurisdiction when it found the sum of activity to be primarily commercial and declined jurisdiction when the activity was noncommercial and closely connected with educational purposes.14 The frequent result was that the Board would not become involved with collective bargaining at universities even
at the instance of blue-collar employees.' 5
Nineteen years after the Columbia decision, the Board reversed its policy by asserting jurisdiction in Cornell University."' Noting the size and scope of the operations of a modern, multi-campus university, the Board concluded that an
assertion of jurisdiction was required "to insure the orderly,
effective, and uniform application of the national labor policy. '1 7 The Board recognized that large educational institutions do have a substantial impact on commerce."' The Cornell decision was followed by another assertion of jurisdiction
over private universities in Yale University" and by the promulgation of a jurisdictional rule. This rule provided that the
Board would assert jurisdiction over any private nonprofit col12 143 N.L.R.B. 568 (1963).

"Id.
14 Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 152 N.L.R.B. 704 (1965); Massachusetts Inst. of
Technology, 152 N.L.R.B. 598 (1965); University of Miami Inst. of Marine Science
Div., 146 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1964).
IsAmendments to the National Labor Relations Act enacted by Congress in
1959 specifically restated and codified the Board's already exercised discretion to decline to assert jurisdiction where the impact of the employer's activities on interstate
commerce were not found to be substantial. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976). It may be
argued that by virtue of these amendments Congress implicitly approved the Board's
commercial-educational test for asserting jurisdiction.
Is 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
17

Id. at 334.

Is Id.

19 184 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
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lege or university with a gross annual revenue of $1,000,000 or
more. 20 Thus, the Board decisively opened up a new area for
collective bargaining under the auspices of the Act.
While Cornell has been heralded as the cornerstone for
protection of collective bargaining rights of university employees under the Act, an interesting quirk of that decision is that
the jurisdiction of the Board was not a litigated issue. Although the union had actively sought to represent a unit of
nonprofessional library employees, it was the employer, Cornell University, which filed the representation petition for
election. Thus, jurisdiction was not an issue between the parties. The Board, however, obviously had to overrule Columbia
in order to conduct the requested election in Cornell, and apparently the Board was eager to do so.21
The Board's new approach of extending jurisdiction faced
its first direct court challenge in NLRB v. Wentworth Institute.22 In enforcing the Board's bargaining order, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument that an exclusion from jurisdiction for private nonprofit educational institutions should be implied from the Act, from its legislative
history,2 3 or from the Board's previous policy. 4 The court
noted that the Board never had ruled in its earlier cases that
it lacked jurisdiction. 25 The court stated: "With respect to the
Board's own precedents, it is not an abuse of discretion for
the Board to reappraise its position in light of developments
in society, as long as its new construction is consistent with
20 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1970).

2' Even though simply petitioning for an election presents an implicit challenge
to the precedent of a refusal to assert jurisdiction, the decision of the Board in Cornell would have more precedential value if the jurisdictional issue had been litigated
actively by the parties to the case.
One commentator has criticized the Board's assertion of jurisdiction in Cornell as
being ill-advised on the facts of that case. Elizabeth Moore has urged that the extension of jurisdiction was inappropriate because that assertion meant the imposition of
an industrial labor relations model on a wholly different sort of employer. Moore argues that the Board "considered the impact on commerce rather than the impact on
education." Moore, supra note 1, at 43.
"' 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975).
21Id. at 553.
2, Id. at
25 Id. at

554.
555.
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the language and tenor of the Act."2 Wentworth effectively
settled the issue of the Board's jurisdiction over the private
university as an employer.27
The Wentworth decision, however, left other issues unsolved. It did not settle the question of whether the Board
properly has jurisdiction over a private university owned or
operated by a religious institution." Nor did Wentworth decide whether the Board has jurisdiction over the individuals it
seeks to include in any given bargaining unit, a question
which has spawned the bulk of the university cases heard by
the Board.
II.

SUPERVISORY-MANAGERIAL EMPLoYEEs

The National Labor Relations Act provides that supervisors cannot be included in a bargaining unit with nonsupervisory employees. 29 The Board and the judiciary have developed

a similar exclusion for "managerial" employees.3 Thus, in attempting to define the appropriate bargaining unit, the Board
and courts must determine whether certain employees are supervisors or managerial employees. In the university faculty
context, this determination has two dimensions, both created
by the collegial system of university governance. First, the
Id.
Wentworth, however, did not end the criticism leveled against the application
of the Act in the university context. Commentators writing before and after the
Wentworth decision expressed theories that the differences between the university
governance structures and the industrial model of the Act rendered the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over universities inappropriate; that application of the Act to universities would require drastic adjustments within the universities' governmental organizations; and that application of the Act to the academic community was not
particularly well thought out. See Brousseau, Collective Bargainingand Private University Governance: A Look for the Law Schools, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 625 (1977); Ferguson, Collective Bargaining in Universities and Colleges, 19 LAB. L.J. 778 (1968);
Kahn, The NLRB and HigherEducation: The Failureof Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 63 (1973); Note, Collective Bargainingby University
and College Faculties Under the National Labor Relations Act, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 71
26

27

(1975).

" See notes 151-80 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Board's
treatment of collective bargaining at religious institutions.
29 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), (11), 164(a) (1976).
30 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320 (1947).
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question arises, whether the faculty as a whole or in committee are supervisory or managerial employees. If this question
is answered negatively, the issue then becomes whether the
department chairmen are supervisory or managerial employees. These questions of the supervisory or managerial status of
the various faculty members produced much litigation after
Cornell and were nearly settled issues under the decisions of
the Board. Recent decisions of the courts of appeals, however,
questioned the Board-developed solutions, and the Supreme
Court's decision in Yeshiva firmly rejected the Board's position, at least on the managerial issue.
Before inquiry can be made into the question of the managerial or supervisory status of faculty members, these terms
first must be defined. The statutory definition of supervisor
provides that an individual will be found to be a supervisor if
he is authorized to act in the interest of the employer, while
still exercising his own independent judgment in hiring, firing,
promoting and disciplining other employees, in directing their
work, in adjusting their grievances, or in recommending any
such action to the employer.3 1 Thus, an employee authorized
to perform any of these functions will be excluded from the
bargaining unit of supervised employees on the ground that
such an employee is a supervisor. Similarly, managerial employees, while not technically supervisors, are closer to management than to rank and file employees. Those employees
who "formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer" are considered to be managerial and are excluded
from the unit.3 2
A.

Faculty Members as a Whole and Faculty Committees

In the university context, the Board has consistently held
that faculty members as a whole are not supervisory or managerial employees. Even though they may exercise authority to
perform functions normally considered to be supervisory,
3129 U.S.C.

§ 152(11) (1976).

3' NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974) (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)).
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faculty members are not considered to be supervisors or managerial employees if that authority is exercised as a group.
This group authority distinction was first3 expressed in
C.W. Post Center of Long Island University.
[W]e are of the view that the policymaking and quasi-supervisory authority which adheres to full-time faculty status
but is exercised by them only as a group does not make
them supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act, or managerial employees who must be separately represented. Accordingly, we find that full-time university faculty
members qualify in every respect as professional employees
under Section 2(12) of the Act, and are therefore entitled3 4to
all the benefits of collective bargaining if they so desire.
The Board's contrast between managerial employees and professional employees, however, is misleading and fails to address satisfactorily the managerial issue. A finding that an individual has the characteristics of a professional employee,
i.e., one who predominantly performs intellectual, nonstandardizable work requiring a background of advanced
study and involving the exercise of discretion and judgment,3
should not preclude a finding that the same individual also
possesses supervisory or managerial authority. That professional employees would not be considered supervisors or managers, however, appeared to be the Board's conclusion.36
The Board did not elaborate on its Post theory until
Adelphi University.3 7 In Adelphi, the supervisor-manager issue involved members of the grievance and personnel commit"

189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).

Id. at 905. This view was criticized severely by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in its Yeshiva decision. The court observed that when the Board first announced its Post principle of collective exercise of authority, "it did so without benefit of analysis, and without citation to pertinent administrative decisions, judicial
precedents or legislative history." Yeshiva, 582 F.2d at 698 n.14.
29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a) (1976).
30 In Yeshiva the Supreme Court specifically rejected the Board's distinction between the professional interests of the faculty and the managerial interests of the
university. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
37 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972). In Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972), and
Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971), the Board cited Post as controlling without
elaborating on its theory that exercising group supervisory authority did not make
faculty members supervisors.
"
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tees instead of the whole faculty as in Post. These committees
exercised a great deal of authority that was obviously supervisory or managerial in nature. The Board, however, held that
these powers were not sufficient to qualify the individual
members of the committees as supervisors or managers, since
the powers were exercised by a group and in accordance with
collegiate principles of university governance."8 The Board
noted that a purely collegial system of campus governance
posed difficulties with the supervisor/managerial issue. "Because authority vested in one's peers, acting as a group, simply would not conform to the pattern for which the supervisory exclusion of our Act was designed, a genuine system of
collegiality would tend to confound us."' 39 The Board, however, was not faced with a true "management committee" situation, and its holding rested on the finding that the ultimate
decisionmaking authority of the institution rested with the
university's Board of Trustees and not with the faculty
committees.4 °
The Board stated:
It is therefore apparent that these faculty bodies-the more inclusive
one in Post and the smaller, representational one here-are not quite either
fish or fowl. On the one hand they do not quite fit the mold of true collegiality. But on th&other, surely they do not fit the traditional role of "supervisor" as that term is thought of in the commercial world or as it has been
interpreted under our Act. We are not disposed to disenfranchise faculty
members merely because they have some measure of quasi-collegial authority either as an entire faculty or as representatives elected by the faculty.
We therefore find that the several members of the University personnel and
grievance committees here are not supervisors within the meaning of the
Act solely by reason of such membership, and we shall include them in the
bargaining unit.
Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.
In support of the Board's views, one commentator, Matthew W. Finkin, has argued that the faculty's judgment on supervisory or managerial matters is collectively
formed, that the judgment is subject to independent review by the university administration, and that the faculty have no real right to compel implementation of their
judgments. Thus, Finkin would draw a distinction between exercising influence over
matters of professional concern and the possession of formal bureaucratic authority.
Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education,5 U. TOL. L. REV. 608, 614-18 (1974). The
difficulty with this argument is that the legal definitions of supervisors and managerial employees do not draw the distinction Finkin proposes.
-,Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.
40 Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Yeshiva, rejected the "ultimate
authority" rationale with the observation that such authority being invested in the
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In subsequent cases, the Board developed an additional
rationale in support of the Post principle. In University of
Miami,41 the Board again noted that final authority for "management" decisions was vested in the university's Board of
Trustees but also pointed out that decisionmaking power held
by faculty under a collegial system was "exercised in the
faculty's own interest rather than 'in the interest of the
employer.' "42
In the first case to reach appellate review challenging the
Post principle of finding faculty to be nonsupervisors, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the Board's holding.43 In NLRB v. Wentworth Institute,44 the court enforced

the Board's bargaining order, making the following observation on the governance of the Institute: "The structure is hierarchical, and there is no evidence of an instance of significant
faculty impact collectively or individually on policy or managerial matters other than the scheduling of exams, classes, and
other such routine matters."45 The Wentworth governance
system, however, was markedly different from that normally
encountered in four-year colleges and universities. 6 No
faculty member or committee at Wentworth had any authority that could reasonably be termed supervisory or managerial. Thus, the Board was not faced with the difficulties it encountered in Adelphi or Post, and its decision could be easily
affirmed.
The Yeshiva case was more difficult, for Yeshiva Univeremployees themselves "has never been thought to be a prerequisite to supervisory or
managerial status. Indeed, it could not be since every corporation vests that power in
its board of directors." NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 685 n.21.
41 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974).
42 Id. This language was echoed in New York Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1148, 1149
(1975).
43 NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975).
Id.
4" Id.
44

at 557.

Wentworth Institute was a two-year college. The governance structure of
Wentworth was accompanied by the usual plethora of faculty committees, but none
of those committees had any real power or authority, and the facts of the case
presented no evidence of significant faculty input on decisions of substance. The absence of such an authoritative committee system enabled the court to affirm the
Board's conclusion that Wentworth's faculty were not supervisory or managerial employees. Id.
46
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sity's system of governance
greatly differed
from
47
Wentworth's. The Yeshiva system included six undergraduate colleges and four graduate schools, each operating with
substantial autonomy over curriculum design, grading systems, and academic standards. These colleges and schools
were governed by a strong committee system. The smaller colleges frequently used a simple faculty consensus which effectively controlled appointments, promotion, tenure, curriculum, and academic standards. In fact, the university's
organization closely resembled the genuine collegial system
that the Board described in Adelphi.48 Nevertheless the
Board ordered the university to bargain, 49 resulting in the
Board's petition to the Second Circuit for enforcement of its
bargaining order.
The Second Circuit, however, denied enforcement of that
order. Rejecting the inference that employees who are found
to be professionals necessarily are not supervisors or managerial employees, the court dismissed the Board's arguments
that the faculty of Yeshiva were neither supervisory nor managerial employees.50 Pointing to the extensive control the
Yeshiva faculty possessed over key policies of the university,
the court concluded: "[T]hey no longer are simply exercising
individual professional expertise. They are, in effect, substan5 1 The
tially and pervasively operating the enterprise."
Board's second argument, based on the Post principle that the
collective exercise of supervisory or managerial authority
saves the individuals involved from supervisory or managerial
47For a description of the governance system, see NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582
F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978).

48See text accompanying note 39 supra for a discussion of a purely collegial gov-

ernance system.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Yeshiva recognized the true functioning
of the governance system of Yeshiva. "Indeed, the ability of the full-time faculty effectively to recommend or even to exercise many of the enumerated powers of section
2(11) and to formulate and effectuate University policy is not really disputed here."

Id. at 696.
"' Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597 (1977). The Board previously had defined the
bargaining unit to include full-time faculty. Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1057

(1975).
50NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 697.
81 Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
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status, similarly was rejected. The court recognized that a literal reading of the statutory definition of the term supervisor
supported the Board's exclusion of faculty committee members from supervisory status5 2 but observed that nothing in
the Act's legislative history supported the Board's view.53 The
court stated that a realistic interpretation of the statute would
find committee members to be supervisors if the committee
performed supervisory functions." The court, however, found
resolution of the supervisor issue unnecessary because the exclusion of managerial employees from the bargaining unit had
problem concerning group exercise of
no such 5analytical
5
authority.
Logically, we see no reason that the fact that the policies of
a company are created by a group . .. rather than by an

individual shouId be of significance in determining whether
an individual has managerial status, and the Board has advanced no satisfactory rationale for the weight it has given
this factor.s
The Board also advanced the arguments that the faculty
were not managerial or supervisory employees because they
acted on their own behalf and not on the behalf of the employer and because ultimate authority resided in the Board of
Trustees. As for the former, the court found nothing in either
the record or the Board's reasoning to support the proposition
that the faculty acted on its own behalf and not on the uni52

Since the control here in issue is not that of individual faculty member

over nonprofessionals, but the collective control exercised by the faculty either in concert, through department chairmen, or through faculty dominated committees, it must be conceded that if read literally the statutory
definition can be construed not to cover the full-time faculty. Since students are not employees the individual faculty supervision over students
does not fit within the statutory definition, which requires that the supervisory power be directed to employees.
Id. at 699.
52 The court noted that "such collective supervision was not actively considered
by Congress at the time." Id.
Id. The court also questioned the precedential value of Post. See note 34
supra for the court's language.
5 Id.

"Id.

at 699-700.
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versity's behalf.57 Noting the autonomous nature of Yeshiva's
colleges and the record of faculty decisionmaking, the court of
appeals concluded that at Yeshiva "faculty" and "college"
were nearly synonymous." As for the ultimate authority argument, the court found this stance "particularly unconvincing."5' The court observed that the Board had never been precluded from finding corporate employees to be supervisors or
managerial employees even though they were ultimately controlled by their boards of directors.60 Having thus rejected the
Board's attempt to apply the Post principles to Yeshiva, the
court denied enforcement of the Board's bargaining order.
The Second Circuit's Yeshiva decision temporarily threw
the state of the law on the supervisory-managerial status of
university professors into considerable confusion. A re-examination of the Board's precedents and the court of appeals' decision was made possible by the granting of certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court.6 1 The Board urged the same
arguments before the Supreme Court as it advanced before
the court of appeals: that university faculty were not managerial employees because supervisory authority was exercised
collectively; that faculty acted on their own behalf; and that
62
final authority rested with the university Board of Trustees.
In the majority opinion,6 3 Justice Powell disposed of the first
and third arguments with the observations that they were
"flatly inconsistent" with precedent, "insupportable," and
abandoned by the Board's attorneys on oral argument." In response to the Board's second argument that faculty members
acted in their own interest, the Court stated:
In arguing that a faculty member exercising independent
57 Id.

at 700.
Is"[T]he fact that the administration and Board of Trustees of Yeshiva so rarely
interfered in the faculty decisions indicates that the interests of the faculty and of
the University were almost always co-extensive." Id.
11 Id. at 701.
60Id.
61 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
62 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
63 Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens.
444 U.S. at 685, 686 n.22.
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judgment acts primarily in his own interest and therefore
does not represent the interest of his employer, the Board
assumes that the professional interests of the faculty and
the interests of the institution are distinct, separable entities
with which a faculty member could not simultaneously be
aligned. The Court of Appeals found no justification for this
distinction, and we perceive none. In fact, the faculty's professional interests-as applied to governance at a university
like Yeshiva-cannot be separated from those of the
institution.65
The Court stated that "[t]he controlling consideration in this
case is that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial.""6 In affirming the judgment of the court of appeals,
the Court concluded that the Board's conclusions were neither
"rationally based on articulated facts" nor "consistent with
'6 7
the Act.
Emphasizing the distinction between the interests of the
professors and the interests of the employer, the dissenting
opinion6 8 endorsed the Board's theories. Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the faculty members were
not expected to conform to management policies, were not accountable to the administration in its governance function,
and were not "representative of management"; thus, he concluded that they should not be considered managerial employees. 69 This argument, however, fails to rebut satisfactorily the
points made by the majority. The dissent did not dispute the
majority's conclusion that the faculty's authority was "unquestionably managerial." Nor did the dissent demonstrate on
the facts of this case that the professional interests of the
faculty were wholly distinct from the interests of the university, an essential point for reaching the minority's conclusion.
The sum of the Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision is that
private university faculty members who sit on committees
65

Id. at 688.

" Id. at 686.

Id. at 691.
68 Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices White, Marshall and
Blackmun.
69 444 U.S. at 699.
67
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which exercise managerial functions will be considered managerial employees. 70 As such, those faculty members will be excluded from a bargaining unit of professional employees.71
This decision, as a matter of legal analysis, unquestionably is
72
correct.
Faculty members who work together on committees governing appointment and tenure, grievance adjustment, or similar management oriented areas clearly exercise supervisory or
managerial authority when they act collectively. The contrary
position of the Board that collective activity, merely because
it is collective, diffuses supervisory authority to the extent
that a committee can exercise authority, but the individuals
who make up the committee cannot, is unrealistic. The
Board's view overlooks the dynamics of a committee decision
wherein each participant exercises his independent, and supervisory or managerial, judgment. The Board's diffusion
principle is simply without sound analytical support.
Similarly unsound is the Board's theory that faculty committees act more on behalf of the faculty than in the interest
of the university-employer. The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court effectively rebutted this argument with extensive
discussions of the common interests of university and faculty
and the concept of shared authority in university governance.
These courts performed a "realistic assessment of the way in
which a university such as Yeshiva functions.

73

Indeed, the

70 See text accompanying note 32 supra for the definition of managerial employees adopted by the Yeshiva majority.

7' Presaging the Supreme Court's holding in Yeshiva, one commentator asserted
that proper recognition of the existence of real authority in the university governance
context would require the exclusion from a faculty bargaining unit of any faculty

member who regularly participated in the decisionmaking process concerning employ-

ment, promotion, transfer, suspension, discharge, or grievance adjudication (if such
process required the exercise of independent judgment). Wollett, Faculty Collective
Bargainingin Higher Education: An OrganizationalPerspective, 3 J.L. & ED. 425
(1974). Although Wollett casts his exclusion in supervisory terminology and the Court
rested instead on the managerial exclusion, it is clear that the intent and practical
effect of either theory is the same.
71 The debate over the wisdom of the Yeshiva decision as a matter of policy has
already reached the floor of Congress. During the past session, legislation was introduced to reverse the Court's holding by amending the statutory definition of supervisor in § 2(11) of the Act.
73 582 F.2d at 700.
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faculty and the university are often, as in the instance of
Yeshiva, one and the same. Thus the collective action of the
faculty in supervisory matters must be viewed as being in the
employer's interest, as well as in that of the faculty.
The Yeshiva decision clearly will have a profound effect
upon the size of the professional employee bargaining unit at
universities generally. The holding will be detrimental, and
perhaps devastating, to faculty collective bargaining at
smaller universities, and will prove particularly harmful to
new efforts to organize faculty and institute collective bargaining. While faculty attempts to bargain collectively may be
rendered futile by Yeshiva's exclusion of numerous faculty
members from the bargaining unit, the decision is logically
based on sound legal principles.
B.

Department Chairmen

Another dimension of the supervisory or managerial employee issue, and one not directly addressed by the Court in
Yeshiva, is the inclusion of department chairmen7 4 in the bargaining unit. Yeshiva does, however, furnish guidelines for
proper resolution of this issue and indicates that the Board's
solutions in this area will fare somewhat better than did those
in the faculty committee context.
In determining whether a department chairman is a supervisor, the Board must decide whether the chairman fits
within the statutory definition of supervisor. Since the statute
poses reasonably straightforward factual criteria, 7 the Board's
decisions have rested upon a balancing of the facts of each
case.
In C. W. Post 78 and Long Island University, 7 the Board
established the pattern for balancing the factual criteria of
section 2(11). The Board noted that the most important crite74 See generally Menard, Exploding Representation Areas: Colleges and Universities, 17 B.C. INDUS. CoM. L. REv. 931, 945-57 (1976) (discussion of the supervisory status of department chairmen).
7 See text accompanying note 31 supra for a description of the criteria used to
determine whether an employee is a supervisor.
76 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
7 Id. at 909.

1980-811

FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

rion for resolving the supervisory issue in the faculty context
is whether the chairman has the authority to make effective
recommendations on hiring, promotion, discharge, work direction and grievance adjustments. Concluding that the department chairmen were supervisors in Post, the Board stated
that "[t]he ... facts established that deans and department
chairmen . . exercise the authority to make effective recommendations as to the hiring and change of status of faculty
members and other employees. 78 Absent such authority, the
chairmen would not be considered supervisors and could be
included in the bargaining unit. Allegations that a chairman
possesses supervisory authority could be defeated either by
showing that the chairman does not have authority individually to act or recommend on supervisory matters, as in the
Fordham University cases,7 9 or that if he has such authority,
that his recommendations are not effective, as in University
80
of Detroit.
In Fordham the collegial system of group authority was
viewed as overruling any contention that the chairmen there
acted as supervisors. 1 Clearly, the Fordham rationale is an
application of the Post collective authority principle: when supervisory authority is exercised collectively, no individual of
78 Id. at 906. Subsequent decisions on the supervisory status of chairmen have
followed the pattern established by these early cases. Where chairmen had authority
to recommend such things as hiring, promotion, and discharge, they were excluded
from the bargaining unit. See University of Vt., 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976); New York
Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1148 (1975); Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 218 N.L.R.B. 1435
(1975); Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 673 (1973); Syracuse Univ., 204
N.L.R.B. 641 (1973); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
79 214 N.L.R.B. 971 (1974); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971).
11 193 N.L.R.B. 566 (1971). Subsequent Board decisions have held that a department chairman is not a supervisor where the existence of a committee or collegial
system precluded the formulation of the chairman's own opinions into committee recommendations, or where the chairman's recommendations were not followed frequently enough to conclude that those recommendations were effective. See Boston
Univ., 238 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1977); Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597 (1977); Fairleigh
Dickinson Univ., 227 N.L.R.B. 239 (1976); Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247
(1975); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973); Rosary Hill College, 202 N.L.R.B.
1137 (1973); Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28 (1972).
81 In the first Fordham decision, the Board stated that "it is apparent that decisions as to appointment, promotion, and tenure are in fact made not by the chairman
alone, but by the faculty of the department, acting as a group." 193 N.L.R.B. at 138.
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the collective group shall be considered a supervisor. 2 The
Supreme Court's emphatic rejection of the Post principle in
Yeshiva effectively renders the rationale advanced in Fordham useless. The Detroit theory that chairmen are not supervisors if their recommendations are not automatically effectuated, however, retains vitality because it does not focus on
how the chairman's recommendation is formulated but rather
is based on what happens to that recommendation once it has
been made. 3
Thus, the general standard for determining the status of
chairmen vis-A-vis their professional colleagues involves an examination of complicated interrelationships of individuals and
committees, faculties and administrations. Even though an inquiry into the individual chairman's personality and political
acumen may be more revealing than an objective examination
of the office he holds for purposes of determining the effectiveness of his recommendations,"4 the Board's examination is
limited to scrutiny of the chairman's office. Even with this objectivity, the resolutions are not simple to perform. As the
Board observed in New York University: "Attempting to
identify and resolve the complex threads, and even the nuances, of the relationship among the faculty, administration,
and department chairmen is not an easy task, nor one usually
susceptible to a completely satisfactory conclusion."8 5 Nevertheless, the Board has fashioned a reasonably workable means
82As the Board stated in Northeastern:"But in arriving at a conclusion on this
issue the Board has given consideration to the principleof 'collegiality.' In appropriate cases where the chairman's powers have been effectively diffused among.the department faculty pursuant to the principle of collegiality, the Board has included the
chairmen." 218 N.L.R.B. at 251-52.
83 In both Detroit and Fordham, the Board viewed as significant the fact that
the chairmen considered themselves, and were considered by the university and
faculty, to be one of or a representative of the faculty, and not a part of the administration. Detroit Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. at 568; Fordham Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. at 139. See
generally Moore, supra note 1, at 48. Although this may be true generally, it is questionable whether this self-image or perceived role has any legal significance. Factors
of self-image are not a part of the Act's definition of supervisor.
" "The Board's inability to recognize the real exercise of supervisory authority is
understandable. In most campuses, the exercise of authority is a fluid process beyond
the ken of all but the most energetic professor-politicians." Moore, supra note 1, at
55.
85 205 N.L.R.B. at 9.
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of measuring the supervisory status of department chairmen.
The Board's factual determinations as to the supervisory
status of department chairmen have been challenged twice in
the courts of appeals. In NLRB v. Wentworth Institute," the
First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the chairmen were
supervisors in that hierarchical governance system. In Trustees of Boston University v. NLRB,87 however, the First Circuit agreed with the Board's determination that the department chairmen there were not supervisors. 8 In upholding the
Board, the court stated that its "analysis of whether chairpersons are excluded supervisors or managerial employees looks
to the degree of control exercised by chairpersons over other
bargaining unit personnel and the relative amount of interest
they have in furthering the policy of the administration as opposed to the members of the bargaining unit."89 The court
noted that the chairmen at Boston University made recommendations as to appointments, reappointments, promotions
and discipline based on consultation with the faculty but that
the president and Board of Trustees made the final determinations on such matters.9 0 The court held that the collegial
principle defeated any inference of supervisory status. Further, the court stated that the chairmen did not exceed the
fifty percent rule in their supervision of nonunit employees. 91
Using this reasoning, the court enforced the Board's bargaining order.
In Boston, the First Circuit adopted the principle which
the Second Circuit, and subsequently the Supreme Court, rejected in Yeshiva. In Yeshiva, the Court spurned the Board's
argument that diffusion of supervisory or managerial responsibilities functioned to preclude a finding of supervisory or
managerial status for the faculty members involved. The Boston court conceded that the university chairmen's recommendations as to the appointment and reappointment of full-time
515 F.2d 550 (lst Cir. 1975).
575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 305.
89 Id.
17

90 Id.

91 Id. at 306. For a discussion of the 50% rule, see notes 95-104 infra and accompanying text.
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faculty were followed "more often than not.

'92

However, the

fact that the chairmen consulted with the faculty in making
their recommendations led the court to the conclusion that
"the Board was entitled to find that the chairperson's recommendations were not 'effective' or that he/she was acting 'in
the interest' of the faculty, not of the employer." 93 Ultimately
the Supreme Court vacated the First Circuit's decision in Boston and remanded it to the court of appeals. 4 This remand,
along with the Yeshiva decision, makes it clear that the
Board's Post principle of collective or collegial exercise of supervisory authority will no longer be considered a valid legal
proposition. Thus, collective exercise of authority does not
preclude a finding that chairmen are supervisors within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
Yeshiva, however, only destroys the argument that a diffusion of a chairman's ability to formulate effective personnel
recommendations is sufficient to defeat a finding of supervisory status. The statutory test that supervisory status can rest
upon a department chairman's authority to make effective
recommendations remains valid. Now, however, this determination must be made without the crutch of the Post principle.
C. ProfessionalEmployees Who Perform Supervisory Functions Over Non-Professional Employees
In resolving the question of supervisory or managerial
status for faculty members, an issue involving the professional
employee's performance of supervisory functions over nonprofessional employees also arises. The question raised is whether
a professional employee, frequently a department chairman,
will be excluded from the bargaining unit of professional employees because that employee supervises nonunit, nonprofessional employees. Yeshiva did not address this issue; in this
area, Board decisions provide the controlling law. The NLRB
has resolved the question by using a balancing test.
12 Id. at 305.
93 Id. at 306.
94 445 U.S. 912 (1980). On remand the court of appeals must determine whether

the department chairmen of Boston University possess the authority to make effective recommendations concerning hiring and firing.
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Relying on its industrial precedent, the Board in Adelphi 5 adopted the Westinghouse fifty percent supervisor
rule.96 This rule provides that a professional employee is not
considered a supervisor or managerial employee merely because he has authority to perform supervisory functions over
nonunit employees if the majority of his time is spent performing nonsupervisory unit work. 7 The Board stated the rationale for the fifty percent rule in Adelphi:
[A]n employee whose principal duties are of the same character as that of other bargaining unit employees should not
be isolated from them solely because of a sporadic exercise
of supervisory authority over nonunit personnel. No danger
of conflict of interest within the unit is presented, nor does
the infrequent exercise of supervisory authority so ally such
an employee with management as to create a more generalized conflict of interest of the type envisioned by Congress
in adopting Section 2(11) of the Act."'
The clear intent of the fifty percent rule is to balance the
competing interests of the professional employee as a bargaining unit employee and as a supervisor. Although the efficacy
of the rule in accomplishing this goal is less than clear, 9 it has
the advantage of ease of application.
The rule has been applied on several occasions to defeat
allegations of supervisory status. In Adelphi, the fifty percent
rule resulted in the inclusion of the director of admissions in
9' 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).

163 N.L.R.B. 723, 727 (1967). See generally Menard, supra note 73 at 951 for
a discussion of the rule.
9 Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 644.
90 Id.
" Finkin argues that the 50% rule "seems admirably suited" and preserves the

"integrity of the professional group." Finkin, supra note 38, at 640. Numerous factual
possibilities, however, can be envisioned where a strict application of the rule would
have the opposite effect. For example, a professor who spent 45% of his work time in
the classroom teaching and 55% of his work time in a research facility supervising
graduate research assistants would be little different from a professor who performed
similar duties but in reverse proportion, yet the 50% rule would exclude the former
and include the latter in a bargaining unit of professional employees. The 50% distinction is rendered even more inaccurate in this hypothetical by the nature of the
"supervisory" task involved because the supervision of graduate assistants, who are
generally university employees, is functionally analogous in many respects to classroom instruction.
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the bargaining unit of professional employees. 10 0 Similarly, the

rule has been applied to include professional librarians, 10 1
"core" faculty of a graduate school,10 2 and chairmen 0 3 in the
bargaining unit. The Board viewed this result as comporting
with the reality of professional employees' duties and needs.
[P]rofessional employees frequently require the ancillary
services of nonprofessional employees in order to carry out
their professional, not supervisory, responsibilities. But that
does not change the nature of their work from professional
to supervisory, nor their relation to management. They are
not hired as supervisors but as professionals. The work of

employees that may be "supervised" by professionals in this
category is merely adjunct to that of the professional and is
not the primary work product.'
Generally, the fifty percent rule provides a workable and
approximate index of managerial interest. The rule permits a
college professor to hire, fire, and direct his secretary and his
typist and remain, for collective bargaining purposes, a college
professor.
In summary, a faculty member's inclusion in the bargaining unit depends, in part, on his status as a supervisor or
managerial employee. Yeshiva holds that a faculty member
who exercises authority over personnel decisions, even if that
authority is only exercised through a committee, will be excluded from the bargaining unit. Department chairmen will be
included in the unit only if they lack the capacity to individually exercise supervisory authority or to make effective recommendations on supervisory matters. A faculty member will not
be excluded from the employee unit, however, for supervision
of nonprofessional employees unless that supervision encompasses the majority of his time. Thus, given Yeshiva and
Board decisions as precedents, a determination of supervisor/
100 Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
101 Mt. Vernon College, 228 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1977);

New York Univ., 221 N.L.R.B.
1148 (1975).
101 Goddard College, 234 N.L.R.B. 1111 (1978).
101 New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973).
10 New York Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. at 1156. This analysis does not necessarily
hold true in the university context. See note 99, supra.
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managerial status now can be made without considerable
difficulty.
III.

THE COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST ANALYSIS

A faculty member's status as a supervisor or managerial
employee is not the only issue involved in defining the appropriate faculty bargaining unit. Another question to be resolved is the extent to which the faculty member shares his
colleague's aims and concerns.
The major guiding principle in the definitional process of
fixing the scope and composition of a bargaining unit thus is
the concept of community of interests. The National Labor
Relations Act charges the Board with responsibility to define
a bargaining unit that will "assure to employees the fullest
freedom to exercise the rights guaranteed by this [Act]." 105
This duty has been interpreted to mean a gathering into a single unit of those employees who share economic and other
job-related interests, excluding from the unit those employees
whose interests are divergent from those of the community.
Indeed, the statutory exclusion of the supervisory employee
and the case law exclusion of the managerial employee are
prime examples of the exclusionary effect of the community of
interest principle.
A threshold question in representation litigation before
the Board is the issue of defining an appropriate bargaining
unit; in fact, assertion of jurisdiction by the Board is the only
problem which precedes unit definition. Accordingly, after asserting jurisdiction over universities in Cornell, the Board in
that case plunged into the bargaining unit controversy, utilizing the precedent of the community of interest criterion developed in the Board's adjudication of industrial disputes.
In determining whether a particular group of employees
constitutes an appropriate unit for bargaining where an employer operates a number of facilities, the Board considers
such factors as prior bargaining history, centralization of
management particularly in regard to labor relations, extent
of employee interchange, degree of interdependence or au05

29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
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tonomy of the plants, differences or similarities in skills and
functions of the employees, and geographical location of the
facilities in relation to each other. We are mindful that vie
are entering into a hitherto uncharted area. Nevertheless, we
regard the above principles as reliable guides to organization
in the educational context as they have been in the industrial, and will apply them to the circumstances of the instant
106
case.
The Board concluded that a separate statewide bargaining
unit for library employees was not warranted.
Since the employees in Cornell were clerical employees
and not the professional persons the Board was soon to encounter, the determination of the bargaining unit's scope was
not a particularly novel or unusual task, except that the
Board was dealing for the first time with an employer whose
business was higher education. The Board since has encountered no particular difficulty in applying the enumerated community of interest criteria to any group of university employees, including faculty.10 7 The scope of the unit sought has
been an additional consideration in the Board's balancing of
the facts, 108 and concern with the scope of the representation
sought has led to the concept of unit fragmentation. In the
university faculty cases, the Board occasionally has granted
clearly separate, smaller groups of employees an opportunity
to choose not to be included with the main unit of general
university faculty; thus far, however, fragmentation has been
limited to professional schools, usually law schools. 10 9
In cases where separate representation is sought for a
professional school, the Board must inquire into the justifia100 Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. at 336. Other traditional community of interest
criteria include similarity in the scale and method of determining salary, benefits,
hours and other conditions; similarity in the kind of work performed; similarity in the
qualifications, skills and training of the employees; continuity or integration of production; desires of the employees; and the extent of organization among the employees. See A. Cox, D. BOK, & R. GoRmAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 300 (8th
ed. 1977).
207 See, e.g., Goddard College, 234 N.L.R.B. 1111 (1978); Fairleigh Dickinson
Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 673 (1973).
21 Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. at 675.
109 Separate representation must be actively sought or the professional school is
included in the main university bargaining unit. Id. at 676.
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bility of the separation. In Fordham, the first case to allow
unit fragmentation, the Board held that "the law school
faculty constitutes an identifiable group of employees whose
separate community of interests is not irrevocably submerged
in the broader community of interest which they share with
other faculty members." 110 The Fordham Board isolated several factors which justified its decision: the separate accreditation of the law school, the specialized training of the law
faculty, the separate and exclusive building, the independent
administration, the independent determination of working
conditions, the independent calendar, and the lack of interchange between law and lay faculty."" In the Board's view,
these factors suggested that the law faculty was an identifiable group which was not "so highly integrated" with the
uni1 12
unit.
bargaining
single
a
compel
to
whole
a
as
versity
Subsequent fragmentation cases have found separate

units to be appropriate for both lawl1 3 and medical schools. 1 4

As a rule, these decisions have not contributed new elements
to the analysis, but the rationale for the Fordham test finally
110 193 N.L.R.B. at 137. Writing in another forum, Member Kennedy stated that
fragmentation of a faculty bargaining unit by severing a group of employees would be
justified where "the differences between the two groups of employees in terms of their
conditions of employment are so significant that inclusion in a single unit would preclude meaningful bargaining." Kennedy, Unit Determination in Colleges and Universities, 1974 LAB. REL. Y.B. 151, 161.
"1 193 N.L.R.B. at 137.
112 Id. Scholarly review of Fordham and decisions in subsequent similar cases
has been critical. Commentators have not taken issue with the concept of fragmentation, which bears a strong analogy to the concept of industrial craft units, but they
have objected strongly to the Board's resolutions of the issue, finding the Board's
reliance on divergencies between professional school faculty and the balance of the
university faculty to be unpersuasive and exaggerated, and stressing, instead, the
common function of teaching and the common goal of education. See, Brousseau,
supra note 27, at 644; Finkin, supra note 38, at 633-34; and Menard, supra note 73,
at 974-75. These criticisms tend to overlook or to minimize the reality that professional school faculty members possess an economic potential outside the university
which the ordinary faculty typically cannot match. This economic potential gives the
professional school professor a real bargaining power in excess of that of other
professors.
3 See University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); University of San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. 12 (1973); Catholic Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 130 (1973); New York
Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973); Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641 (1973).
"' See University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976); University of Miami,
213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974).
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was explained in Syracuse University. 15 All the factors of
Fordham were present in Syracuse University, thereby rendering the law school at Syracuse "virtually autonomous." Beyond these objective items, the Board noted a subjective element which set the university situation clearly apart from the
industrial bargaining model, stating:
[Flaculty may have an interest in, even a paramount allegiance to, a particular discipline. This allegiance may transcend shared interests in the economic benefits and the conditions of employment.
...Because of those special interests, which have uncommon importance in this context, we believe we must be
especially watchful in guarding the rights of minority groups
whose intellectual pursuits and interests differ in kind from
the bulk of the faculty. Granting a voice merely in determining whether such a group shall be swallowed up by the collective body or shall have separate representation will not
answer. Rather it requires yet another choice, that of standing alone without representation116regardless of the choice of
the university body as a whole.
In Syracuse, then, with unusual eloquence, the Board determined that faculty of professional schools should be permitted to decide by ballot for representation with the rest of
the university faculty, for separate representation, or for
nonrepresentation.
The unit fragmentation procedure was sustained by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in its Boston University'1 7 decision. The court rightly observed that some of the separating
factors that had been applied to the law school applied
equally to several other professional schools that had been included in the main university unit. The presence of other distinguishing factors, however, such as a separate admissions office, library, calendar, salary schedule and tenure periods,
precluded the court from finding that the Board had acted in
an arbitrary fashion. The court concluded that because the
findings of the Board were supported by substantial evidence,
15

204 N.L.R.B. 641 (1973).

16 204 N.L.R.B. at 643.
117 575 F.2d at 306-08.
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the Board had not abused its discretion.11
Sufficiently significant differences, therefore, may justify
segregating groups of faculty who collectively possess certain
unique characteristics that effectively set those faculty members apart from the rest of the staff. This separation in no way
poses a challenge to these faculty members' basic identification as faculty. Such segregation, illustrated by the Boston decision and others, wholly comports with the requirement of
the Act that the Board select an appropriate unit for bargaining, 1 9 and finds precedential support in the craft unit decisions of the Board in the industrial sector.
A. Adjunct or Part-Time Faculty
The area of the unit determination controversy showing
the greatest confusion and change has been that of the adjunct professor. Following industrial precedent, the Board in
early cases1 20 included part-time faculty in the bargaining
unit. This result was reached through development of a somewhat artificial unit determination test to be applied to the adjunct faculty members. Known as the "functions and qualifications" test, the rule was articulated first in C.W. Post
2
Center of Long Island University."
In Post, the Board included adjunct faculty in the bargaining unit. Focusing on the qualifications and function of
the part-time employees, the Board concluded that the two
faculty groups shared similar characteristics; both full-time
and part-time professors are professional employees, both
have professional qualifications, and both pursue the teaching
function.1 22 This test of function and qualification soon was
followed in University of New Haven,1 2 3 which expressly relied on the Post decision. The Board in New Haven reiterated
11Id. The Supreme Court's vacation and remand of the First Circuit's decision
for reconsideration in light of Yeshiva should have no real effect on this issue because
Yeshiva did not present or address the unit fragmentation question.
119 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
,20 See notes 122-27 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of these early
cases.
121 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1974).
122 Id. at 905-06.
123 190 N.L.R.B. 478 (1971).
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the focus on qualification and work function but added two
elements to the part-time professor problem; the Board restricted inclusion in the faculty unit to "regular" part-time
faculty and allowed the parties the option to agree to exclude
124
part-time personnel.

The first New Haven addition to the Post part-time rule,
restricting its consideration to "regular" part-time faculty,
created immediate difficulties. For example, in New Haven
the Board included in the "regular" part-time faculty category
adjuncts who spent as little as three hours per week in the
classroom, when the normal full-time teaching load was twelve
hours per week. 125 Subsequently, the Board in University of
Detroit 26 elevated this ratio to the status of a test for the
meaning of "regular." In Detroit, the Board decided to include the quarter-time professor because, in the view of the
Board, he had "a substantial and continuing interest in the
wages, hours, and working conditions of unit employees.

1 27

Despite the lip service given to the fundamental bases of
the community of interest principle, the apparent focus of the
Board in Detroit, as in Post and New Haven, was on professional qualifications and work function. Seemingly, the Board
accorded little weight to the fact that New Haven adjunct
professors did not participate in most fringe benefits, had no
opportunity to attain tenure, and would not be hired if there
were no student demand for the courses they taught. Comparable factors similarly were passed over in several subsequent
cases where the part-time faculty was included in the bargaining unit on the grounds of similar function and
28
qualifications.

The approach in the part-time faculty cases was problematic in that it was not at all consistent with the normal community of interest standards which the Board purported to
124

Id. These two elements are not at all unique to the university context.

125 Id.

at 478.

126 193 N.L.R.B. 566 (1971).
127

Id. at 567.

See Catholic Univ. of America, 201 N.L.R.B. 929 (1973); College of Pharmaceutical Sciences, 197 N.L.R.B. 959 (1972); Florida Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B.
888 (1972); Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B.
134 (1971); Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 909 (1971).
12
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apply. The Board finally admitted the error of the Post-New
Haven-Detroit line of cases in New York University.12 The
New York opinion, remarkable for the extent and quality of
its exposition, expressly abandoned the New Haven inclusionary rule and reversed the previous posture of the Board:
[A]fter careful reflection, we have reached the conclusion
that part-time faculty do not share a community of interest
with full-time faculty and, therefore, should not be included
in the same bargaining unit.... We are now convinced
that the differences between the full-time and part-time
faculty are so substantial that we should not adhere to the
principle announced in the New Haven case. We shall exclude all adjunct professors and part-time faculty members
who are not employed in "tenure track" positions. 13
Moreover, the Board specifically admitted in a footnote to the
decision that its previous decisions on the adjunct professor
issue failed to establish a workable standard.1 31
Accordingly, the Board elected to examine more carefully
the factors which comprise community of interest and concluded in New York that the differences in compensation,
participation in university government, tenure eligibility, and
working conditions that existed between part-time and full129 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973). The abandonment of the New Haven rule represented
a recognition by the Board that the rule suppressed and excluded from consideration
too many elements of the community of interest test and that the cases decided
under that rule frequently rested on a very narrow factual base, despite the fact that
the community of interest test itself is a very broad standard.
131 Id. at 6. One commentator observed that "It]he new rule has the decided
advantage of ease of application. In addition, it does rough justice, for the most cases
where academic tenure is available the position would be considered as comprising
part of the core faculty." Finkin, supra note 38, at 631-32.

"'

The Board stated:

Justice Stewart in Boys Market Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970),
quoted with approval Justice Frankfurter's earlier observation that "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because
it comes late."
Our abandoment [sic] of the New Haven rule is the result of arguments
advanced by the parties in this and other pending cases as to the function,
nature, and character of part-time faculty members. We have also been influenced by the Board's inability to formulate what we regard as a satisfactory standard for determining the eligibility of adjuncts in Board elections.
205 N.L.R.B. at 6 n.9.
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time faculty precluded a finding of real "mutuality of interest" between the two groups. 13 2 The New York rule of parttime faculty exclusion, however, is not an absolute rule, for it
does allow the inclusion of faculty on the "tenure track." 133
Although part-time faculty eligible for tenure are likely to be
rare, the Board may include a part-time professor on the
ground that tenure is available to him.
Additionally, in Kendall College,134 the Board included in
the faculty bargaining unit part-time faculty members who
were employed on a "pro-rated" full-time contract but excluded part-time faculty members employed on a "percourse" contract. 13 5 The Board suggested that the part-timers
with "pro-rated" full-time contracts had interests that were
substantially closer to those of the full-time faculty than were
those of the part-timers employed on a "per-course" basis.1 30
Thus, Kendall illustrates that when the facts of a case so require, the exclusionary rule of New York, based on community of interest grounds, will yield to a showing of a real community of interest.
Subsequent decisions of the Board have followed the New
York rule. 3 7 Moreover, in Catholic University,3 8 the Board
reconsidered on its own motion a decision rendered five
Id. at 7.
Shortly thereafter, the Board buttressed its New York decision in University of
San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. 12 (1973). In San Francisco,the Board again directed its
attention to the real economic and academic differences between the full-time and
adjunct law professor. Adjunct professors at the San Francisco law school did not
work under a formal contract, did not receive fringe benefits, did not have an office at
the school, did not participate in governance of the school, did not draw regular salary, and were not eligible for tenure. Given this list of distinctions, the Board felt
"constrained to conclude that part-time faculty, or adjunct professors, do not have a
community of interest with the full-time faculty." Id. at 13. As in New York, parttime professors were excluded from the bargaining unit of regular law faculty.
133 205 N.L.R.B. at 6.
13, 228 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1977), enforced, 570 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1978).
135 Id.
138 Id. Those part-time faculty members employed on a "pro-rated" full-time
contract generally were either dual-function employees, performing administrative
and teaching duties, or former full-time employees. 570 F.2d at 220.
137 See, e.g., Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1975); Northeastern Univ., 218
N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 673 (1973); Catholic Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 130 (1973).
132

138 205 N.L.R.B. 130 (1973).
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months before New York and reversed a decison which had
relied on New Haven.1 39 The Board has enjoyed the unanimous approval of its New York rule in the courts of ap-

peals, 140 and for this reason the law on the issue of the part-

time professor seemingly is settled by New York. 141
B. Support Personnel

The term "support personnel," if broadly defined, can include all nonteaching university employees. For potential inclusion in a faculty bargaining unit, the particular office or position of the nonteaching employee in question must satisfy
several prerequisites. A threshold requirement for the inclusion of a nonteaching university employee in a faculty bargaining unit is a finding that the employee, like the faculty
member, is a professional employee.

42

Once professional em-

ployee status is established, the educational work function
239

Id.

"' Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597 (1977), enforcement denied, 582 F.2d 686
(2nd Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 672 (1980); Trustees of Boston Univ., 228 N.L.R.B.
1008 (1977), enforced, 575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S.
912 (1980); Kendall College, 228 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1977), enforced, 570 F.2d 216 (7th
Cir. 1978).
141 The New York rule of presumptive exclusion of part-time faculty from
a bargaining unit of full-time faculty has not received universal acclaim among commentators. Menard proposed a presumption of inclusion, rebuttable by a showing "that
part-time employment is so intermittent that exclusion is justified or that the nature
of their contractual arrangement with the institution is so significantly different from
that of regular full-timers that [exclusion] is warranted." Menard, supra note 74, at
945. Menard's proposal tends, however, to look narrowly toward the same sort of
analysis initially undertaken by the Board under the New Haven rule and thus would
seem to invite extended litigation on frequency of employment and differences between employment contracts, while overlooking other equally important factors.
142 Strictly speaking, a finding of professional status for a particular nonteaching
employee or a particular group of such employees is not necessary in order to include
those employees with teaching or professional employees. However, an election in
such a proposed unit is a rather complicated procedure. Section 9(b)(1) of the Act
requires that before the Board can certify a unit of employees which would include
both professional and nonprofessional employees, the professional employees must be
afforded an opportunity to vote on the issue. Thus, professional employees vote on
two issues: (1) for or against representation, and (2) for or against inclusion of the
nonprofessional in their unit. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Sonotone Corp.,
90 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1950). To avoid such a complicated election and to have nonteaching support personnel nonetheless included in a faculty unit necessitates a finding of
professional employee status for the support employee.
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test must be satisfied; 143 given the inherent breadth of the

term, "educational work function," this is easily accomplished.
For example, having determined that a specific group of
librarians (those with advanced degrees in library science) satisfied the requisite elements, the Post Board included the ibrarians in the faculty bargaining unit.1 44 Librarians satisfy
the educational function test because a large part of the educational process is research-oriented. Moreover, the Board has
stretched its work function test beyond the closely allied area
of research to include clinical psychologists on the staff of a
university's counseling center. 145 Inclusion of the psychologists
was based on the Board's view that the function of the university-employed clinical psychologist constituted "supportive
activities clearly associated with the educational process." 46
The educational work function test implicates the supervisory employee problem because certain employees perform a
double function. Employees, such as head librarians, are professional employees performing an educational work function;
at the same time they also supervise nonunit, and perhaps
unit, personnel. Falling back on the usual supervisor tests, the
Board has excluded from the faculty bargaining unit head 11brarians who supervise professional unit employees 147 and has
employed the Westinghouse-Adelphi fifty percent rule where
the supervision is over nonunit employees.148
Additionally, administrative personnel are excluded from
the bargaining unit under the work function test if the primary duties of the employee are administrative.1 9 Exclusion,
however, is premised upon the absence of sufficient commu145

C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).

'"Id.Librarians have since been included in faculty units with fair regularity,
and the decisions have rested upon findings of professional employee status and educational work function. See, e.g., University of San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. 12 (1973);
Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28 (1972); Florida Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B.
888 (1972); Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 909 (1971).
I'5 Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.RB. 247 (1975).
146 Id. at 252.
147 University
148

of San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. 12 (1973).

Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B.

4 (1973).
149 Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); Florida Southern College, 196
N.L.R.B. 888 (1972).
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nity of interest rather than upon the theory of supervisor
status.

150

The issue of inclusion or exclusion of various support personnel has not generated much controversy, primarily for two
reasons. First, support personnel, as a rule, do not constitute a
major portion of employees and thus have an insignificant impact on unit determination.15T Second, the unit composition
issues often are narrowed substantially by stipulation prior to
litigation before the Board; therefore, the issue often is not
presented to the NLRB.
C.

Religious Faculty

While the law is reasonably settled on the issue of inclusion of part-time faculty and support personnel in the faculty
unit, the law with regard to inclusion or exclusion of religious
faculty (defined for purposes of this article as faculty members who are also members of religious orders) is anything but
clear. In dealing with the religious faculty issue, the Board entered into a new area, for the situation posed was truly unique
in the history of the Board. The decisions of the Board reflect
its amateur status in the religious faculty context; enforcement of its decisions has twice been denied on the ground
that the action of the Board was unreasonable and arbitrary.
The controversy began innocuously enough with Fordo The application of the work function test to administrative personnel had a
dramatic impact on Mercy College, 219 N.L.R.B. 81 (1975). The Board in Mercy had
entered a bargaining order against the college, declining to rule on a challenge to the
ballot cast by the athletic director. The court of appeals, denying enforcement, remanded for a hearing on the challenge, which alleged that the athletic director was
not eligible to vote because he was an administrative employee. On remand, the
Board found that the athletic director was an administrative employee and thus did
not share a community of interest with the faculty. Upon striking his ballot, the
union lost the representation election, and the union's charge of refusal to bargain
was dismissed. Id.
151Moore warns that the inclusion of more than a bare minimum of support
personnel in a faculty bargaining unit would yield impractical results. Since a faculty
unit would likely desire to include in an agreement faculty-oriented issues like governance, research, tenure standards, and chairmen selection procedures, Moore argues
that the inclusion of nonteaching personnel "will muddy the situation and require
essentially two contracts for one bargaining unit. Thus, the two units may as well be
separated initially." Moore, supra note 1, at 58.
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ham University.152 Several members of the Fordham faculty
were Jesuit priests, but the Board apparently thought this
factor was unimportant and included the priests in the bargaining unit. 153 Two years later, the Board in Seton Hill College1 " excluded religious faculty from the faculty bargaining
unit and overruled Fordham to the extent that Fordham
"may be deemed inconsistent with this Decision."' 5 5 The
Board excluded the religious faculty of Seton Hill from the
bargaining unit because, in the view of the Board, the divergent interests of the religious faculty members and the complex relationship of those faculty to the college established a
sufficient basis for separation of the religious and lay groups.
The Board said that since the college was owned by the religious order, the religious faculty members were an integral
part of the employer and subject, by virtue of this connection
and their religious vows of obedience, to a conflict of interests
if included in the unit.156 The Board reached a like conclusion
in St. Francis College,1 57 where less than ten percent of the
faculty were members of the Franciscan order, and ordered
separate bargaining units.
Two subsequent Board decisions refined the Board's position on the religious faculty issue. In D'Youville College,1 53
the college was no longer owned by the affiliated religious order and no more than one-third of the Board of Trustees were
permitted to be members of the order. Thus, the four religious
faculty members in question were not viewed as part of the
employer, thereby, in the opinion of the .Board, distinguishing
Seton Hill; additionally, the parties of D'Youville stipulated
193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971).
"' The Board stated that "[t]here is no evidence that membership in the order
is in any way inconsistent with collective bargaining in respect to a Jesuit's salary or
other terms and conditions of employment." Id. at 138.
154 201 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1973).
,55Id. at 1027 n.4.
'1 Id. at 1027. The facts of Seton Hill, however, are easily distinguishable from
those of Fordham. At Fordham, the religious faculty represented a minority of the
faculty, and the university was primarily laymen-operated. Seton Hill, on the other
hand, was owned by the religious order (Sisters of Charity), and 50% of the board of
trustees and 60% of the faculty were members of the order.
'5 224 N.L.R.B. 907 (1976), enforcement denied, 562 F.2d 246 (3rd Cir. 1977).
15 225 N.L.R.B. 792 (1976).
112
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for inclusion. Similarly, in Niagara University,159 the Board
included in the faculty bargaining unit four religious faculty
members who were not of the order which "owned and operated" the university.1 60 The Board excluded from the unit,
however, seventeen religious faculty members who belonged to
the "owning" religious order. 1" The net result of these decisions apparently is that membership in a religious order will
warrant exclusion from the bargaining unit if the order has
substantial ownership and control of the university.
Courts of appeals that have reviewed the Board's unit determinations in the religious faculty area have refused to en16 2
force those decisions. In both St. Francis
and Niagara,163
the two appellate cases on religious faculty, the Board's rulings were rejected as arbitrary. The religious faculty constituted a minority of the faculty in both cases, and in Niagara
the religious order involved did not own the university and
was permitted no more than one-third of the seats on the
Board of Trustees."" The Niagara court observed that exclusion of the religious faculty members on these facts was inconsistent with the D'Youville precedent and held that the sole
ground for exclusion, the religious faculty's vow of poverty,
was unrelated to any relevant criterion for unit determination.16 5 Agreeing with the Niagaracourt's position concerning
vows of poverty, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in St.
16 addressed the ownership
Francis
issue on facts similar to
Seton Hill. The court rejected the Board's claim for exclusion
from the unit as being unsupported by the evidence; the court
found no difference between the relationships of the religious
'" 226
160 Id.

N.L.R.B. 918 (1976), enforcement denied, 558 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1977).

161Id. The Board determined that the university was owned and operated by the
religious order. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found this determination
to be "totally unsupported by the evidence." Niagara Univ. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1116,
1119 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977).
162 224 N.L.R.B. 907 (1976), enforcement denied, 562 F.2d 246 (3rd Cir. 1977).

226 N.L.R.B. 918 (1976), enforcement denied, 558 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1977).
I6 The court of appeals did not find the university to be owned by the religious
order, and therefore did not reach the issue of excluding members of an owning religious order from the bargaining unit.
163

165
16

558 F.2d at 1120-21.
562 F.2d at 253, 257.
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faculty and lay faculty to the college. 16 7
IV.

JURISDICTION OVER RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Curiously, Board decisions to exclude religious faculty
from a bargaining unit where that particular religious order
has substantial ownership and control of the university utterly
fail to confront the jurisdictional question raised by the order's ownership and control of the institution. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals was the first tribunal to directly confront the jurisdictional issue.16 8 In Catholic Bishop v.
NLRB, 169 a case which involved parochial high schools, the
court held that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction presented
17 0
a conflict with the religion clause of the first amendment.
In its discussion, the court noted that the issuance of a
bargaining order against an employer inevitably has an inhibiting effect upon the employer's managerial habits but observed that, in the usual industrial-commercial context, issuance of the order is supported by sound policy considerations.
Nonetheless, the court denied enforcement of the Board's bargaining order, stating that "when that imposition conflicts
with the religion clauses. . . the First Amendment protective
1' 7 1
wall should prevail.
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision but declined to reach
the constitutional issue.1 72 Reviewing the statutory history of
the National Labor Relations Act and its several amendments,
the Court first concluded that there was no clear expression of
congressional intent to include teachers in church-operated
schools within the scope of the Board's jurisdiction. Second,
the Court said that there was "abundant evidence" that such
an inclusion would implicate the religion guarantees of the
167

Id. at 253.

'" In previous cases, the Board had formulated a policy of declining jurisdiction
when it found a school to be "completely religious," while accepting jurisdiction when
it characterized a school as "merely religiously associated." Catholic Bishop v. NLRB,
559 F.2d 1112, 1116-18 (7th Cir. 1977).
169 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), afl'd, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
170 Id.
171

Id. at 1124.

172 440

U.S. 490 (1979).
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first amendment. 73 The Court therefore held that the constitutional issue need not be reached because interpretation of
statutory language and analysis of legislative history failed to
disclose congressional intent to grant jurisdiction to the Board
17
over teachers in church-operated schools.

1

The immediate impact of the Catholic Bishop decision
has been to remove not only parochial elementary and secondary schools from the reach of the Act but also to place cases
such as Seton Hill beyond the Act's scope. The high schools
in Catholic Bishop were wholly-owned and -operated by the
church, and similarly owned and operated colleges and universities now must be considered to be outside the scope of the
Board's jurisdiction. This decision, however, does not determine the issue of the Board's jurisdiction over colleges which
are supported, governed and/or operated by a blend of laymen
and religious orders, because the Catholic Bishop decision in
truth leaves unresolved what it purported to resolve.
Rejecting the test of "completely religious" versus
"merely religiously associated" which the Board had applied
in the parochial high school cases, the Supreme Court created
a new jurisdictional test of "church-operated.'

'75

If a school or

college is church-operated, the Board does not have jurisdiction. Essentially, the Court merely substituted one substantively indefinite standard for another; it did not escape the
litigious task of clearly defining the parameters of the Board's
jurisdiction. The "church-operated" test adopted by the Court
is, however, a significant step removed from the first amendment difficulties raised by the "completely religious" versus
"merely religiously associated" dichotomy used by the Board
in the Catholic Bishop case.
Since the Catholic Bishop decision, the Board has asserted its jurisdiction over schools and colleges which, while
having a history of being church-operated, in fact are no
Id. at 507.
506. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing the dissenting opinion in the 5-4 decision, would have construed the Act broadly so as to uphold the Board's initial finding of jurisdiction and then would have confronted the first amendment issues. Id. at
508-18.
175 Id. at 500, 506.
173

174 Id. at
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longer church-operated. 176 The Board ruled in Diocese of
Brooklyn17 that a private high school governed by a lay board
of trustees and operated independently of the Catholic Diocese which had formerly owned and operated the school "is an
entity separate and distinct from the church. 17 8 The Board
concluded that the school was not church-operated even
though over half of the faculty of the school had been members of the faculty when the school had parochial status, a
substantial portion of the faculty were members of religious
orders, religious courses were required of all students, and all
faculty members had defined religious instruction responsibilities. 7 9 Similarly, the Board asserted jurisdiction in College of

Notre Dame'80 and Barber-Scotia College, Inc.,' 1 basing its
decisions on the facts of independent boards of trustees and
lack of financial and administrative connections between the
college and the formerly controlling religious institution.
The two college cases, Notre Dame and Barber-Scotia,
were clouded by the Board's discussion of the differences between secondary and higher education as a ground for distinguishing Catholic Bishop. Differences clearly exist between
these educational levels, but none mentioned was germane to
the jurisdictional questions outlined by the Supreme Court in
Catholic Bishop; the standard announced in Catholic Bishop
was based upon the facts of ownership and operational
control.

82

Since the Catholic Bishop test likely is satisfied on the
facts of Notre Dame and Barber-Scotia,the assertion of juris178 Diocese of Brooklyn, 243 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1979). Conversely, the Board has

declined jurisdiction in subsequent cases, specifically relying on Catholic Bishop in
such orders. See, e.g., Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1979);
Gordon Technical High School, 243 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1979); Bishop of Gary, 243
N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1979).
,77243 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1979).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 245 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1979).
181245 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1979).
181 The Board itself had used the facts of ownership and operational control as
grounds for excluding faculty from bargaining units in Seton Hall and Niagara, and
the Supreme Court, in effect, merely elevated the Board's exclusionary standard to a

jurisdictional test.
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diction in those cases is a proper result. The emphasis that
the Board placed on the differences between secondary and
higher education, however, is not only unnecessary as a decisional ground but is an improper consideration under the
Catholic Bishop criteria.
CONCLUSION

At this writing, the institution of collective bargaining
among university faculty is being challenged on many
fronts.1 8 The conclusions of the Board in areas such as the
part-time faculty and support staff issues have been endorsed
solidly. On fundamental issues, however, the rulings of the
Board have failed in direct challenges before the United
States Supreme Court. The Catholic Bishop decision held
that the Board may not assert jurisdiction over a religiously
sponsored and controlled ("church-operated") educational institution. Additionally, the Yeshiva court found, contrary to
the arguments of the Board, that the collegial or committee
exercise of what typically is considered to be managerial authority will cause employees on such committees to be classified as managerial employees. The Supreme Court's remand
of Boston University for reconsideration in light of Yeshiva
must be taken to mean that the collegial principle, as applied
to department chairmen, no longer can serve as a ground for
permitting the inclusion in a faculty bargaining unit of a
chairman who exercises supervisory or managerial authority,
even if he does so with faculty consultation.
The Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision is clearly correct.
The analysis of Justice Powell in the Yeshiva opinion yields
an equally sound position whether focusing on the managerial
employee, as in Yeshiva, or the supervisor. The Act, in defining the term "supervisor," uses the phrase "any individual
having authority, in the interest of the employer ... [to make
or] effectively to recommend" supervisory decisions or acI" The Wall Street Journal reports that a dozen private colleges have refused to
bargain with faculty unions since Yeshiva and that more are expected to refuse to
negotiate following the expiration of current contracts. Wall St. J., May 20, 1980, at 1,
col. 5.
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But the statutory definition includes no requirement
that the particular individual act wholly individually nor does
it preclude him from acting with another in a supervisory capacity. Moreover, as noted before, the managerial employee
definition has never been encumbered by the problem of the
individual versus the group exercise of authority. Catholic
Bishop is a less satisfactory opinion, for it fails to set forth
any clear guidelines concerning the meaning of "church-operated." But the decision is important for it perhaps shows the
Court's willingness to restrict the Board in its assertion of jurisdiction over religious, albeit educational, institutions.
The Board has thus been rebuffed on two fronts. The impact of Yeshiva will be to preclude the institution of collective
bargaining among faculty at smaller colleges and universities,
because practically all faculty members at a collegially-governed college sit on at least one supervisory or managerial
committee. And the impact of Catholic Bishop, already noticeable in subsequent cases before the Board, has been to restrict the Board's view of its jurisdiction over a class of private employers.185 These Supreme Court decisions have dealt
organizing efforts among private university faculties a severe,
although not necessarily fatal, blow. After a ten-year span of
intense organization and litigation spawned by the Board's expressed willingness to assert its jurisdiction, to plunge into the
determination of appropriate bargaining units, and to direct
the elections therein, such organizational efforts undoubtedly
will decline. The Board's apparent inability to assert effectively its jurisdiction in many, if not most, faculty collective
bargaining and representation cases can have no other result.
1

tions. 8

184
185

Bishop.

4

29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
See note 176 supra for a list of cases which reflect the impact of Catholic

